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Zac Cogley 
ANGER IS A GIFT:  HOW PSYCHOLOGY AND ETHICS ILLUMINATE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 
PETER WHITE SCHOLAR PROPOSAL 
 
Project Abstract (232 Words) 
 
This proposal details a project that builds on my current interdisciplinary research 
program to articulate and develop a novel theory of moral responsibility. Like many 
philosophers, I maintain that whether someone is morally responsible for an action 
depends on whether it is appropriate to adopt attitudes such as anger and resentment 
toward the person. What makes my view unique is how I understand these “reactive 
attitudes.” I show they serve three functions: to appraise the action of a person (e.g. that it 
is wrong), to communicate the appraisal of wrongdoing to others, and to sanction the 
perceived wrongdoer. My defense of this view is also distinctive. Rather than engaging in 
purely armchair philosophical speculation, I appeal to the latest developments in 
empirical psychology,  evolutionary biology, and other relevant empirical sciences. One 
further virtue of my theory is its ability to help us solve theoretical problems in other 
areas of philosophy. For example, my theory clarifies whether people who are 
manipulated into performing actions are morally responsible for what they do and also 
explains what makes forgiveness possible and warranted. Additionally, it allows us to 
resolve serious practical problems in legal and medical ethics that concern the moral 
responsibility of people who engage in compulsive behavior, like addicts. The end result 
of my work will be a book-length monograph that will shape and deeply inform both 
current and future debates about moral responsibility. 
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ANGER IS A GIFT:  HOW PSYCHOLOGY AND ETHICS ILLUMINATE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 
PETER WHITE SCHOLAR PROPOSAL 
 
Project Narrative 
Objective 
 An enormous amount of philosophical work on moral responsibility is inspired by P.F. 
Strawson’s famous paper, “Freedom and Resentment” (1962), which seeks to help us better 
understand our concept of moral responsibility and the norms that govern holding people morally 
responsible by appealing to what Strawson terms the “reactive attitudes.” These emotional 
responses include anger, resentment, and indignation. The idea is that a person’s moral 
responsibility should be understood in terms of the appropriateness of having these emotional 
responses towards her. So, for example, I would take my friend Courtney to be morally 
responsible for not watering my plants while I was away if I think it is appropriate for me to be 
angry with her for not caring for them as she had promised. Many philosophers follow Strawson 
in thinking that someone is morally responsible just in case she is an appropriate target for such 
an emotion (Bennett 1980; Watson 1993; Wallace 1994; Fischer and Ravizza 1998; McKenna 
2012). To a significant extent, however, Strawsonian theories of moral responsibility are 
discussed without attention to work on the emotions in the empirical sciences.  
 The flourishing of such empirical work and its relevance to current philosophical debates 
is what drives my current research program, which aims to bring recent work in philosophy and 
psychology of emotion, sociology, and evolutionary biology to bear on ethical debates, 
particularly focusing on people’s moral responsibility for wrongdoing. With the Peter White 
Scholar Award, I will be able to extend the psychologically informed account of moral 
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responsibility articulated in my previously published essays to new questions about moral 
responsibility, culminating in a draft book manuscript that will seek to answer some pressing 
questions in moral responsibility having to do with desert, manipulation, forgiveness, and 
compulsion. An initial manuscript will help me to pursue a publishing contract with an academic 
press, most likely Oxford University Press. I have an excellent relationship with Oxford 
University Press, which has published two of my essays and has a strong commitment to 
publishing work on moral responsibility and related philosophical issues. Further, I have 
submitted my prospectus to Peter Momtchiloff, one of the area editors for philosophy. He replied 
that when the manuscript is ready, “he would be glad to consider a draft manuscript for 
publication” (see Appendix). Below, I briefly sketch the proposed chapters before describing the 
significance of the project. 
 
Chapter 1: The Three-Fold Significance of the Blaming Emotions:  
In a recent paper in Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility (Cogley 2013a), I 
appeal to empirical psychology to argue that the blaming emotions—anger, resentment, and 
indignation—are significant for our moral responsibility practices in three different ways. Such 
emotions are implicated in our appraisals of wrongdoing, in the ways we communicate the 
appraisal to perceived wrongdoers, and in the manner we sanction people who we appraise as 
wrongful. I argue that when we are angry with someone our anger does three things: it appraises 
that person’s action as wrong, communicates to her that we appraise her in that way, and 
sanctions her by placing a cost on her acting in that manner. I argue that these different 
psychological functions of the blaming emotions are naturally seen as inspiring rival 
philosophical accounts of our concept of moral responsibility and that each kind of account 
therefore implicitly emphasizes different conditions on emotional appropriateness. What I term 
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‘fittingness’ accounts of moral responsibility are linked to appraisal, ‘moral address’ accounts 
correspond to the communicative dimension of the blaming emotions, and ‘desert’ accounts of 
moral responsibility are inspired by the blaming emotions’ sanctioning role. 
 In this chapter, I extend the above analysis to better explain why there is little agreement 
about the nature of moral responsibility, even after so much attention to it. Accounts of moral 
responsibility that emphasize only one function of the blaming emotions can legitimately claim 
to capture important aspects of moral responsibility attributions. However, intuitive judgments 
about when people are morally responsible will then subtly be affected by which conception is 
on offer.  
 
Chapter 2: Deserving the Blaming Emotions:  
In Chapter 2, I further develop a thesis I explore in my recent paper in Philosophical 
Explorations (Cogley 2013b) to find common ground between rival conceptions of moral 
responsibility by articulating what is involved in deserving an emotion like anger, resentment, or 
indignation. My aim is to capture our sense that when someone wrongs us, that person deserves a 
negative emotional response from us even if we know that a negative emotional response could 
lead to problematic consequences. Suppose, for example, that you have a colleague who 
constantly tries to ensure that you are stuck teaching at inconvenient times. Many of us would 
say that the colleague deserves any resentment we feel in the situation, even if we knew that 
actually becoming angry or resentful with the colleague would just make the problem worse.  
This desert sense of emotional appropriateness is often emphasized by incompatibilists, 
who believe that people cannot be morally responsible if their actions are produced by 
deterministic processes. Compatibilists, who believe that people can be morally responsible even 
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if their actions are produced by deterministic processes, have often invoked other senses of 
emotional appropriateness.  
I believe that a careful articulation of the senses in which someone can deserve a blaming 
emotion leads to common ground between the two philosophical camps. To show this, I plan to 
argue that each of the psychological functions mentioned above—appraisal, communication, and 
sanction—has a related moral aim that I will articulate by comparison with other things that 
people can deserve: grades, retorts, and punishments. These exemplars of things that are 
deserved will help me pinpoint the following set of conditions on the deservingness of a blaming 
emotion: a person deserves a blaming emotion just in case she acts wrongfully because she is 
motivated by ill will (or fails to have sufficient moral concern). I will argue that both 
compatibilists and incompatibilists should accept these conditions on deserving a blaming 
emotion. 
 
Chapter 3: the Manipulation Argument and Blaming the Victim:  
Not all incompatibilists will accept that someone deserves a reactive emotion just in case 
she acts wrongfully because she is motivated by ill will or fails to have sufficient moral concern. 
One way that incompatibilists will respond is via an appeal to cases of manipulation (Pereboom 
2001; Mele 2008; Todd 2009; Pereboom 2014). Suppose, for example, you find out that your 
colleague is trying to ruin your teaching schedule because she is being manipulated by a team of 
neuroscientists! Even if you still think she is demonstrating ill will toward you in her actions, 
you might think that since she is doing wrong only because the neuroscientists control her 
actions, then she does not deserve a blaming emotion.  
 In the next stage of my book project, I will argue that we can account for our reluctance 
to blame people who have been manipulated by outside interveners by invoking ethical and 
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psychological work on victim-blaming. The fact that blaming emotions would cause harm to 
victims does not mean that people who are victimized cannot be blameworthy for things they do 
(Houston 1992; Harvey 1999; Hay 2011). Further, psychological research suggests that our 
perceptions of the blameworthiness of victims is affected by factors that do not bear on whether 
the victim is blameworthy (De Judicibus and McCabe 2001; Diekmann et al. 2013). I argue that 
intuitions that manipulated people do not deserve blame can be accounted for by the natural (and 
laudable) motivation not to make people worse off who have already been significantly wronged. 
This provides a powerful new compatibilist response to such cases. 
 
Chapter 4: Uncompromising, but Warranted, Forgiveness:  
Philosophical discussions of forgiveness have long recognized that one puzzle about 
forgiveness is why we should forgive a wrongdoer when forgiveness seems to require no longer 
feeling resentment toward the wrongdoer. If a wrongdoer really is responsible for the wrong, it 
seems she still deserves to be the target of a blaming emotion. It is thus difficult to articulate 
why—even if she apologizes and repents—she does not continue to deserve resentment. Recent 
attempts to finesse this puzzle seem to fail. For example, Pamela Hieronymi (2001) suggests that 
forgiveness amounts to seeing the past action as no longer presenting a continuing threat, while 
Lucy Allais (2008) argues that when we forgive someone, our overall evaluation of the 
wrongdoer no longer includes that particular act. However, both attempts implicitly deny that the 
act of wrongdoing deserves resentment for the wrong in the first place and so deny one of the 
claims that generates the puzzle. 
 In this next chapter I plan to complete with the help of the Peter White Scholar Award, I 
aim to develop a more promising account of forgiveness by appealing to the communicative 
dimension of the blaming emotions. I will argue that a blaming emotion remains accurate even if 
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the target acknowledges fault because it represents the person as having done wrong. However, if 
a wrongdoer sincerely acknowledges fault, then resentment’s communicative aim is fulfilled. 
Because the communicative goal of resentment is satisfied, you can reasonably give up feeling 
the resentment deserved by a blameworthy, but repentant, wrongdoer. 
 
Chapter 5: Responsibility for Compulsive Action:  
Many philosophers hold that people are not responsible for actions that are compelled, 
such as actions take by someone addicted to a drug (Kane 1996; Kane 2007; Ginet 2002; Hume 
2003). However, there is reason to think that addictive behavior is mediated by neural 
mechanisms—specifically, the operation of the reward system—that also underlie non-addictive 
behavior (Kandel, Schwartz, and Jessell 2000; Kuhn and Wilson 2005; Berridge and Kringelbach 
2008) and some philosophers have opposed the idea that compelled behavior is literally 
irresistible (Watson 2004). As the final component of the manuscript I will complete using the 
Peter White Scholar Award, I plan to build on empirical work on human action as well as my 
theory of moral responsibility to argue that we should excuse people who act under compulsion 
because their choices consistently make them worse off, not because their agency is 
compromised. This shows that the fundamental moral objection to punishing addicts is not that 
they are undeserving of punishment. Indeed, they may be deserving of punishment because 
morally responsible for their conduct, but I will argue that punishing them is unfair. I will then 
draw out the legal implications of this claim.  
 
Scholarly Significance 
The book manuscript I will complete with the Peter White Scholar Award will have 
immediate and helpful application in philosophy, political theory, and law, while also 
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illuminating debates about people’s moral responsibility in medicine and retributive justice, as 
shown in the application to the moral responsibility of addicts. The nature of moral 
responsibility, when people are morally responsible for their conduct, and the relationship of 
moral responsibility to political, legal, and medical practice are all the focus of considerable 
current scholarly attention. My project will advance these debates while significantly raising the 
status of NMU’s philosophy department, as well as the University as a whole.  
 
Relation of the Proposed Work to Current Research in the Discipline 
 While there is much current attention to philosophical issues concerning moral 
responsibility, much of the work on moral responsibility is embarrassingly ignorant of the state 
of contemporary empirical research on the emotions and is also not sufficiently attentive to 
relevant work in ethical theory. My interdisciplinary approach is thus essential to advancing 
current debates, and has the potential to shift the structure of much future work on moral 
responsibility. Difficult questions about people’s moral responsibility are among the most 
important in philosophy as they have immediate relevance to significant ethical and legal issues. 
Work on moral responsibility becomes increasingly important with practically every new 
development in psychology. For example, should increased psychological knowledge of the 
nature and causes of psychopathy recommend decreased, similar, or even increased punishment 
for psychopaths who commit crimes? Should knowledge that human behavior is influenced by 
subconscious factors lead us to excuse people who have been swayed by such effects? My 
interdisciplinary account of moral responsibility will help us answer these questions. 
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Project Methods 
My interdisciplinary methodology—I call it Psychological and Philosophical Realism—
assumes that the correct philosophical accounts of moral responsibility and other distinctively 
human concepts must be based on what human beings are actually like. As human nature is 
investigated in many overlapping fields from many diverse perspectives, I must stay current in 
the literature in biology, psychology, sociology, and philosophy, among others. This requires an 
enormous amount of attention to developments in these disciplines, especially empirical 
psychology, where new work on the emotions and morality is generated almost daily. Without 
the Peter White Scholar award I will not be able to continue to stay abreast of all the relevant 
literature. The Peter White Scholar Award will ensure that I have time to continue my 
interdisciplinary inquiries by allowing me time to read new articles in all these fields, write 
summaries of them, and incorporate their insights into this book project.  
As my methods bring philosophical scrutiny to bear on relevant sociological, 
psychological, and biological research, I will not need any special equipment other than my 
current NMU resources: my office, computer, and library access.  
 
Timetable 
 I will utilize the Peter White Scholar Award from the Fall term of 2015 through the 
Winter term of 2016 (the 2015-2016 academic year). I will complete two new chapter drafts 
during the Fall term of 2015 and will complete the final chapter during the Winter term of 2016.  
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Budget 
 My budget request is $17,447. I have allocated $16,314 (including salary and benefits)  
for adjunct coverage of 3 classes (two in Fall of 2015, one in the Winter of 2016) and $1,133 for 
conference travel (inclusive of airfare, meals, and lodging).  
 
Budget Justification 
 I have earned three Reassigned Time Awards at NMU. Each one has allowed me to 
complete a paper; every one of those papers is now published. Two papers were published in 
collections from Oxford University Press and the other in the journal Philosophical 
Explorations. My track record is to finish a book chapter or paper with every course release and 
to place my work in excellent venues. I will therefore have no problem producing three new 
chapters while supported for three course releases by the Peter White Scholar Award. Since I 
currently have material completed that will comprise the majority of Chapters 1 and 2, I should 
be able to complete drafts of five chapters using the award. I also request conference funding to 
attend the 2015 New Orleans Workshop on Agency and Responsibility (NOWAR) organized by 
David Shoemaker of Tulane University. NOWAR is a biennial workshop featuring the 
presentation of sophisticated original research on issues captured under the label “agency and 
responsibility.” I was a presenter at the first such workshop, and the next is scheduled for 
November 2015. NOWAR brings together the highest caliber work on moral responsibility; 
confirmed keynote speakers for 2013 include Julia Driver, (Professor of Philosophy, Washington 
University, St. Louis) and Derk Pereboom (Susan Linn Sage Professor in Philosophy and Ethics; 
Stanford H. Taylor ’50 Chair of the Sage School, Cornell University) 
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Projected Project Outcome 
 The project outcome will be a five chapter draft of my monograph Anger is a Gift: How 
Psychology and Ethics Illuminate Moral Responsibility. Following completion of the project, I 
will submit the draft to Peter Momtchiloff of Oxford University Press with the aim of securing a 
contract for publication. 
 
Plans for Seeking External Funding 
 Building on the completed draft, I will submit applications for at least three faculty 
fellowships. I will apply to Tulane University’s faculty fellowships in the Murphy Institute’s 
Center for Ethics and Public Affairs. I will also apply to the Laurance S. Rockefeller Visiting 
Fellowships at Princeton University’s Center for Human Values. Finally, I will apply for a 
Visiting Research Fellowship at the University of Utah’s Tanner Humanities Center.  
 Each of these fellowships will allow give me time to circulate the manuscript to 
colleagues at other institutions, receive critical feedback, and polish the manuscript into 
publishable form. If I am granted one of these fellowships I anticipate a final contract for the 
book by mid-2018.  
Please see attached appendix for CV, list of citations, and detailed budget. Thank you for 
your consideration, 
 
Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy 
Project title:
Principle Investigator/project 
director: 
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$17,447 $17,447
$17,447 $17,447
AAUP Faculty (summer)
Total
Name/title
Zac Cogley
Role
PI
E. TOTAL SPONSOR REQUEST (B + D)
C. TOTAL OTHER DIRECT COSTS (Exempt from F&A)
D. TOTAL DIRECT COSTS (A + C)
Total
Undergrad academic
Anger is a Gift: How Psychology and Ethics Illuminate Moral Responsibility
Zac Cogley
Adjunct
Job Classification
AAUP Faculty (summer)
AAUP Faculty (summer)
Job Classification
AAUP Faculty (summer)
Zac Cogley
Adjunct 0
Number
B. Facilities and Administration 
Other Personnel Fringe total
TOTAL SALARIES AND BENEFITS
Sponsored Research
TRAVEL
TOTAL TRAVEL
Description
Conferences
Total
AAUP Faculty (summer)
Job classification
 ZAC COGLEY 
Department of  Philosophy                Northern Michigan University 
1401 Presque Isle Ave                               (906) 277-2014 
Marquette, MI 49855                                                                                           zcogley@nmu.edu 
ACADEMIC APPOINTMENTS 
 Associate Professor, Northern Michigan University, 2014-present 
  Honors Faculty, 2012-present 
 Assistant Professor, Northern Michigan University, 2010-2014  
 Visiting Lecturer, University of  California, Los Angeles, 2006-2008 
EDUCATION 
The Ohio State University, Ph.D., Philosophy, 2010 
University of  Cincinnati, M.A., Philosophy, 2001 
St. Louis University, B.A., Philosophy, Summa Cum Laude, 1998 
AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION 
Ethics, Agency Theory, Philosophy and Psychology of  Emotion, Moral Psychology, Social 
and Political Philosophy 
AREAS OF COMPETENCE 
Philosophy of  Law, Applied Ethics (including Medical, Business, and Computer Ethics, and 
Ethical Issues in Law), Feminist Philosophy, Metaethics, Philosophy of  Mind 
RESEARCH OVERVIEW 
My current research aims to articulate a comprehensive theory of  moral responsibility: an 
account of  the nature and norms of  holding people morally responsible. I approach these 
issues with a distinctive, interdisciplinary methodology. I maintain that any adequate theory 
of  moral responsibility must attend to philosophical argument as well as results from the 
empirical sciences. In my published work I solve a vexing problem for extant accounts of  
trust, invoke psychological work on the blaming emotions to show that we have several 
different conceptions of  moral responsibility, pull from a variety of  empirical and 
philosophical sources to develop a nuanced account of  angry virtue and vice, and articulate 
the grounds on which emotions like resentment and indignation are deserved by their 
targets. I am currently extending the view to address other philosophical questions about (1) 
punishment, (2) blaming victims, (3) manipulation, (4) compulsion, and (5) forgiveness.  
  
PUBLICATIONS 
“Rolling Back the Luck Problem for Libertarianism.” March, 2015. Journal of  Cognition and 
Neuroethics 3 (1). 
“A Study of  Virtuous and Vicious Anger.” 2014. Virtues and Their Vices. Kevin Timpe and 
Craig Boyd, eds. Oxford University Press.  
“The Three-Fold Significance of  the Blaming Emotions.” 2013. Oxford Studies in Agency 
and Responsibility. David Shoemaker, ed. Oxford University Press.  
“Basic Desert of  Reactive Emotions.” 2013. Philosophical Explorations 16 (2): 165–177.  
“Trust and the Trickster Problem.” 2012. Analytic Philosophy 53 (1): 30–47.  
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BOOK REVIEWS 
Review of  Michael McKenna’s Conversation and Responsibility. Philosophy in Review, 2013. 
Review of  Tamler Sommers’ Relative Justice: Cultural Diversity, Free Will, and Moral Responsibility. 
Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2012. 
PAPERS IN PROGRESS 
 “A New Challenge to Retributivism” (with Matt Taylor)  
 “Blaming the Victim” 
 “Grading and Manipulation” 
 “Moral Responsibility for Compelled Behavior”  
 “Forgiveness and the Multiple Functions of  Resentment” (with Antony Aumann) 
GRANTS, FELLOWSHIPS, AND AWARDS 
Faculty Reassigned Time Award, Northern Michigan University, 2012 
Course reduction grant for the project “Basic Desert of  Reactive Emotions” 
Experiment Month Grant Winner (with Austin Duggan)—“Experimental Philosophy Study 
of  Hypothetical Manipulation Scenarios,” 2012 
Grant provides material support for experiment dissemination and analysis of  data. 
Sponsored by the American Philosophical Association and coordinated by Yale 
University. 
Faculty Reassigned Time Award, Northern Michigan University, 2011 
Course reduction grant for the project “The Three-Fold Significance of  the Blaming 
Emotions” 
Faculty Reassigned Time Award, Northern Michigan University, 2010 
 Course reduction grant for the project “Virtuous and Vicious Anger” 
Graduate Student Outstanding Paper Prize, Eastern Division Meeting of  the APA, 2009 
Travel Grant, Edward F. Hayes Graduate Research Forum, The Ohio State University,  
2006 
Graduate School Leadership Award Nominee, 2004 
Fellow of  The Ohio State University Graduate School, 2001-02 
Charles Phelps Taft Fellow at University of  Cincinnati, 1998-99  
PRESENTATIONS 
“Rolling Back the Luck Problem for Libertarianism” 
 Free Will Conference, Center for Cognition and Neuroethics (refereed), 2014 
“Fortifying the Self-Defense Justification of  Punishment” 
 Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress (refereed), 2014 
“A New Challenge to Retributivism” (with Matt Taylor) 
 Pacific Division American Philosophical Association Meeting (refereed), 2014 
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“Blaming the Victim” 
 Society for Analytic Feminism, Central American Philosophical Association Meeting  
 (refereed), 2014  
 Workshop on the Duty to Resist Oppression, University of  Connecticut, 2013 
 Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress (refereed poster), 2013  
“Basic Desert of  Reactive Emotions”  
 Loyola University, New Orleans, 2013 
 Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress (refereed poster),  2012 
“The Three-Fold Significance of  the Blaming Emotions” 
 New Orleans Workshop on Agency and Responsibility (refereed), 2011 
“Virtuous and Vicious Anger” 
 UAB Conference: The Normative Implications of  Moral Psychology (refereed), 2011 
 Northern Michigan University, 2011 
 Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress (refereed poster), 2011 
 “Moral Responsibility, Manipulation, and Two Concepts of  Desert” 
  Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress (refereed), 2010  
 “Trust and the Trickster Problem” 
  Eastern American Philosophical Association Meeting (refereed), 2009 
  Feminist Ethics and Social Theory Conference (refereed), 2009 
  Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress (refereed poster), 2009 
 “Plum-Confused about Blame and Responsibility”  
  Southern California Philosophy Conference, 2007 
 “Strawson on What to Feel, and Why” (with Daniel Farrell)  
Contemporary Analytic Philosophy Conference on Regulating Attitudes with Reasons, 
2006 
 “Mitigation and Responsibility” 
  32nd Conference on Value Inquiry (refereed), 2005 
 “Responsibility and Integrity” 
  North American Society for Social Philosophy (refereed), 2004 
 “Kantian Dirty Hands” 
  North American Society for Social Philosophy (refereed), 2003 
 “Whose Evaluative Practice, Which Self-Understanding?” 
  Ohio Philosophical Association Meeting (refereed), 2002 
“Feyerabend’s Incommensurability Thesis in Against Method”  
  Ohio Philosophical Association Meeting (refereed), 2000 
 Kentucky State Annual Conference on Science and Culture (refereed), 2000 
COMMENTARIES 
 “Comments on Erin Taylor’s ‘Social Conventions and Associative Duties’” 
  Central Division American Philosophical Association Meeting, 2014 
 “A Different Kind of  Selective Hard Compatibilism: Response to Paul Russell” 
 Central European University Workshop on the Manipulation Argument, 2012 
 “Modifying the Reactive Attitudes: Reply to David Goldman”  
 Central States Philosophical Association, 2010  
“Does Morality Demand Our Very Best? Reply to Michael Ferry”  
  Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress, 2009 
 “Free Will and Reasonable Doubt: Reply to Benjamin Vilhauer”  
  Pacific Division APA Meeting, 2008 
“Protecting Intentions from Mental Birth Control: Reply to Andrei Buckareff ”  
Inland Northwest Philosophy Conference on Action, Ethics, and Responsibility, 2006 
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SERVICE 
 UNIVERSITY 
  President’s Committee on Diversity, 2015-present 
  Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee (IACUC), 2010-present 
   Vice-Chair, 2013-present  
  Academic Senate, 2011-present 
   Executive Committee, 2013-2014 
  Faculty Review Committee 2014-present 
  Honors Board, 2013-present 
  Mortar Board Advisor, 2013-2014 
 DEPARTMENTAL 
  Departmental Evaluation Committee and Committee of  the Whole, 2010-present 
 PROFESSIONAL 
  Referee: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Philosophical Studies,  
  Canadian Journal of  Philosophy, Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review, Ratio,  
  Oxford University Press, Res Philosophica, American Political Science Review 
 COMMUNITY 
  Marquette General Hospital Ethics Committee, 2011-present 
  Marquette General Hospital Institutional Review Board, 2012-2014 
REFERENCES 
 RESEARCH 
  Justin D’Arms 
  Professor of  Philosophy, The Ohio State University 
  John Martin Fischer 
  Professor of  Philosophy, The University of  California, Riverside 
  Pamela Hieronymi 
  Professor of  Philosophy, The University of  California, Los Angeles 
  Michael McKenna 
  Professor of  Philosophy, The University of  Arizona 
 TEACHING    
  Antony Aumann 
  Assistant Professor of  Philosophy, Northern Michigan University 
  Sean Kelsey 
  Associate Professor of  Philosophy, University of  Notre Dame 
  Sheldon Smith 
  Associate Professor of  Philosophy, The University of  California, Los Angeles 
From: MOMTCHILOFF, Peter peter.momtchiloff@oup.com
Subject: Anger is a Gift
Date: March 13, 2015 at 6:47 AM
To: zaccogley@gmail.com
Dear%Zac
%
Thank%you%for%showing%me%the%outline%prospectus%for%your%planned%book%on%‘How%Psychology%and
Ethics%Illuminate%Moral%Responsibility’.%%This%looks%like%a%very%interesDng%project%and%I%am%keen%to%pursue
it%with%you%on%behalf%of%OUP.%%I%would%be%glad%to%consider%a%draH%manuscript%for%publicaDon%when%it%is
ready.
%
With%best%wishes
Peter%Momtchiloff
%
Editor, Philosophy 
Academic Division 
Oxford University Press 
Great Clarendon Street 
Oxford OX2 6DP 
England 
http://www.oup.co.uk/academic/humanities/philosophy 
phone (44) 1865 354766
Here%is%the%2014%OUP%Philosophy%Catalogue%online:%www.oup.com/uk/academic/philosophy/philcat14
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